Our study initiates an effort to determine if the recent politicization of the U.S. Supreme Court had meant its opinions have less impact on the lower courts who are expected to follow its direction and on the impacted parties upon which its ruling are applied. It is our contention that the court has become increasingly politicized and this politicization has reduced the Courts influence in lower courts and affected parties. We begin our study with the examination of how a recent Supreme Court opinion, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas (570 U.S. ____, 2013) has been applied in the lower and appellate federal courts. This opinion strengthened the application of strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases. It was a well-publicized opinion and its directives were clearly stated in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. It called on courts to apply a 'strong' version of strict scrutiny not only to the objectives being sought but also to the means being utilized. Our initial examination of the diffusion of this precedent shows no influence on lower or appellate courts. But the opinions of the Court are not for the judiciary alone. Our second examination involves how affected parties are reacting to the dictates of the Court. Staying with Fisher, we conducted a survey of public university admission staffs to determine if they have adjusted their admissions processes in response to the Court. We were surprised to discover no reaction. It is clear, the message of Fisher has been lost. We conclude with a brief discussion of where this leaves the Court. Our research begins with an assumption: the judiciary, in general, and the U.S. Supreme
Of the three branches of government, the American public has traditionally held the judiciary in the highest esteem. Unlike the two 'political' branches, Americans, even if they disagree with the Court, have respected its authority to render decisions that overturn a properly elected legislature or a executive operating under his official authority. But what if this were not the case?
Instead, what if the American public and the officials in government viewed the Court as a third 'political' branch?
Our research begins with an assumption: the judiciary, in general, and the U.S. Supreme Court, in specific, is undergoing a politicization process that has not been witnessed since at least the Court Packing Era of the 1930s. By politicization, we mean that the Court, in perception or reality, is basing its judgments not solely on the facts before the Court and the objective application of the law but instead ideological or partisan influence is having a significant impact on the rulings of the Court, irrespective of the facts or the law. This is a highly controversial assumption but we accept this as a given. In this work, instead of demonstrating the veracity of his assumption, our focus is on how such a politicization impacts both the diffusion of Court precedent throughout the judicial branch and also whether the politicization of the Court lessons its ability to influence the behavior of impacted parties within society. We believe that as the Court has become politicized its ability to having its rulings followed has declined. Our paper will proceed in the following manner: in part I we will discuss the recent scholarship suggesting a politicization of the U.S. Supreme Court and the process of diffusion of judicial opinions. In Part II we will detail our specific methodology including a brief description of the changing Court rulings on the used of affirmative action in the admissions process of public universities that led to the Fisher v. Univ. of Texas (570 U.S. ____, 2013) ruling. In Part III we review the paucity of results from our study. In Part IV we offer concluding remarks.
Part I: Politicization and Diffusion

Politicizing the Supreme Court
Much has been written about the decline in the public perception of the U.S. Supreme Court and the judicial branch (Bartels and Johnston 2013) . Americans believe politics played "too great a role" in the original health care cases surrounding the Affordable Care Act by a greater than two-toone margin . Over sixty percent of Americans express no to little confidence in the Supreme Court (Jones 2012) . Academics continue to debate how much politics actually influences the Court, but Americans are excessively skeptical. The vast majority of Americans fail to know that, on average, almost half of the cases brought before the Supreme Court are decided unanimously, and the Justices' voting pattern split by the political party of the president to whom they owe their appointment in fewer than seven percent of cases (SCOTUSBlog 2012) . Why the mistrust? We argue that Americans have increasingly viewed the government as being guided by interests outside of the general good. More specifically, we suggest Americans believe the government is increasingly beholden to specialized, entrenched interests that have corrupted a political system. This is nothing new in relation to Congress and to a lesser extent the Presidency. What is new is that very recently, the distrust shared by Congress and the President has been applied to the courts.
The crafters of the Constitution designed a uniquely independent Supreme Court that would safeguard the Constitution. They feared that the political branches might be able to overwhelm the Court by turning the public against the Court and that the Constitution's strict boundaries on congressional power would give way. Elected officials of both partisan stripes have played into some of the Framers' fears for the Constitution by politicizing the decision and erasing the distinction between the Court's holding and the policy merits of the law or action under question. Politicization of the Supreme Court causes the American public to lose faith in the ability of the courts to render an objective judgment in any particular case. This loss in confidence then is returned into the judicial branch itself. As the viewpoint that the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are rendering decisions outside the facts and law of the cases before them, members of the judiciary have begun to wander from the lessons of the Court in politically salient cases. If this is true, as we forward, lower level courts within the federal system should display an increased tendency to ignore the ruling of the Supreme Court. Instead of walking lockstep with the Supreme Court, lower courts will begin to shy away from Court precedent and render decisions that match the ideological or partisan preferences of the members of the lower court.
The independence of the judicial branch was not the given we have come to accept today.
The antifederalists' primary argument against the judiciary was that it was too powerful without a congressional revisionary power on Court opinions (Yates 1965) . Many of the early state constitutions that were enacted between the end of colonization and the ratification of the U.S.
Constitution encouraged the state executive and legislature to remove, override, or influence judges.
Rhode Island judges were called before the legislature to testify when they invalidated legislative acts (Sherry 2005) . The New Hampshire legislature vacated judicial proceedings, modified judgments, authorized appeals, and decided the merits of some disputes (Corwin 1973) .
Instead, the founders created a Supreme Court that was independent from the political branches and insulated from public opinion. The Supreme Court would be the intermediary between the people and the legislature to ensure that Congress obeyed the Constitution. Congress could not be trusted to police itself for compliance with the Constitution's limited legislative powers. Courts would be "the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments." (Hamilton 1961 ) Still, the most of the founders believed Congress would overshadow the Supreme Court (and the executive, at least domestically). The Framers were so concerned about helping the Court repel attacks by the legislature that they considered boosting its power and inserting it into political issues. James Madison's draft of the Constitution included an additional check against congressional power, the Council of Revision (Madison 1937) . Instead of the presidential veto, the Council would have placed several Supreme Court Justices on a council with the President or asked the President and the Supreme Court to separately approve legislation before it became law. Justices would have the power to oppose legislation on non-legal policy grounds. The Council is nowhere to be found in the Convention's final product, but delegates' arguments from the Council debates reveal a suspicion of Congress, fear for the Court's ability to defend itself, and concern for the Court's public reputation.
Madison believed that even with the Council, Congress would be an "overmatch" for the Supreme Court and President and cited the experience of spurned state supreme courts. Delegates ultimately decided that politicizing the Court would undercut its legitimacy. Luther Martin, a delegate who later became Maryland's longest-serving attorney general, offered the most prescient comment on the subject: "It is necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have the confidence of the people. This will soon be lost, if they are employed in the task of remonstrating [against] popular measures of the Legislature."(Id. at 77) "It was making the Expositors of the Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be done," added Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts delegate (Id. at 75).
Experience in all the
The founders were concerned about the loss of public confidence in the Court's objectivity as the Court engaged in judicial policymaking. Of course, the Constitution does not force judges to "remonstrate" against legislation, but experience proves Martin to be correct. The members of the Supreme Court have been cognizant of this tension since the early period of the Court. Chief Justice Roberts started and ended his health care opinion with the basics-the important distinction between whether the Affordable Care Act is good policy from whether it is a constitutional law.
Within two hours, President Obama and Mitt Romney, both Harvard Law School graduates and the former a professor of Constitutional law, told Americans the opposite. "Today, the Supreme Court also upheld the principle that people who can afford health insurance should take the responsibility to buy health insurance," said Obama ). Romney criticized the majority for deciding not to "repeal Obamacare." "What the Court did not do on its last day in session, I will do on my first day if elected President," said Romney (Romney 2012) .
Increasingly, the Court has become a political dartboard for politicians of both parties. The Court has been castigated for an 'activist' agenda while at the same time critiqued for its lack of action. President Obama told the public at the 2010 State of the Union address that "the Supreme Court reversed a century of law" with its Citizens United decision and suggested that the Court opposed honest elections. The ensuing image was even more damaging. With 48 million Americans watching, the camera panned to a cadre of expressionless Supreme Court Justices sitting in the front row while lawmakers sitting next to them rose to their feet and applauded . Presidents Obama and Bush and members of Congress have derided the Court for its "unelected" nature, with President Obama publicly wondering whether "an unelected group of people would somehow overturn a duly constituted and passed law." Judges lack clear defenses. Judges would risk their credibility if they shouted back at the President, appeared on the Sunday morning talk shows, or held a press conference after a decision. (Bolton 2011) . Proposals to invade the Court's independence ignore the Framers' fears for enforcement of the Constitution without the Supreme Court. Madison believed if the legislature and executive united behind a law and convinced the public that it was in their interest, the people could not properly judge its constitutionality, even if it was patently unconstitutional. The "passions" of the people on the particular issues would prevail over wellreasoned constitutional judgment (Madison 1961) .
Policy Diffusion in the Judiciary
Policy diffusion scholarship, or the scientific study of the process by which a policy innovation is disseminated to potential adopters, has a long and robust history in studies of policymaking. Policy innovations are simply new policy adoptions; the innovation represents the first time a particular agency, legislature, or government has adopted or implemented a particular policy. That scholars have chosen to describe the spread of policy innovations as "diffusion" implies that governments or governmental units influence one another to adopt the new policy (Shipan and Volden 2008) . While most studies of policy diffusion are conducted at the state level and focus on a legislature's decision to adopt a particular policy innovation, there exists a substantial body of literature on the ways in which policy innovations-defined more specifically as new rules or doctrines-spread across court systems. Like studies of legislative policy adoption, most studies of judicial diffusion investigate the transmission of precedent across state court systems (Canon and Baum 1981 , Caldeira 1985 , Savage 1985 , Lutz 1997 , although scholars are increasingly interested in explaining the same process at the federal appellate level (Songer, Segal et al. 1994 , Solberg, Emrey et al. 2006 . In general, theories of policy diffusion center around three sets of determinants: internal, external, and policy specific characteristics. Internal determinants include such factors as institutional structures and characteristics, public opinion, demographic factors, ideology (of both government and the populace), and economic variables (Dye 1966 , Gray 1973 , Erikson, Wright et al. 1993 , Jacoby and Schneider 2001 . External factors typically taken into consideration include the influence of regional neighbors, federal institutions, or historical events (Welch and Thompson 1980 , Berry and Berry 1992 , Mooney 2001 . Finally, most diffusion models include determinants specific to the policy innovation itself; for instance, studies of innovation in criminal justice policy might include measures of crime statistics specific to each unit under observation.
The institutional structures and characteristics of specific courts, along with a well-developed system of judicial communication (via the publication of written opinions), have been particularly cited as having a significant impact on the likelihood that a court will adopt a legal innovation.
Judicial diffusion appears to depend largely on internal determinants such as communication networks (e.g., legal reporting districts, citing doctrine in written opinions), cultural similarities (i.e., shared demographic profiles), and institutional structures and characteristics (e.g., level of court professionalism, caseload, and court prestige) of the courts in question (Canon and Baum 1981 , Caldeira 1985 , Savage 1985 , Caldeira 1988 , Kilwein and Brisbin Jr 1997 , Lutz 1997 ).
In addition to studying the determinants of policy adoption and diffusion, scholars have expanded their scope of research to examine the mechanisms of diffusion. Studies of state legislatures show that states are more likely to adopt policies that have been successful in other states; thus, it appears that states actively learn from the experiences of their peers, waiting to adopt a policy until they are sure that policy will actually work (Volden 2006, Shipan and Volden 2008) .
Extending this logic to judicial diffusion, researchers have documented a similar mechanism at work.
Emulation appears to take place over the long term, as policy innovations and judicial meaning evolve to become commonly accepted (Glick and Hays 1991 , Phillips and Grattet 2000 , Volden 2006 . The process by which appellate courts develop the legal meaning of a concept in response to increasingly accepted judicial rhetoric can then be equated to policy learning (Phillips and Grattet 2000, Shipan and Volden 2008) .
Just as (Volden 2006) suggests that simply having a high proportion of adopting neighbors does not guarantee that a state will adopt a policy innovation, regional influence does not appear to have a significant impact on the likelihood that an innovation will be adopted by a given court (Canon and Baum 1981) . This is likely due to two factors. First, the courts' ability to adopt a precedent is dependent upon opportunity, or the actual supply of cases (Canon and Baum 1981, Caldeira 1985) . No applicable case on the docket? No adoption. Second, the idea of regional neighborhood influence is too narrow for judicial diffusion; the legal system has well-established channels of communication that do not rely on geographical proximity (Canon and Baum 1981, Lutz 1997) . In fact, it is this system of written opinions and legal reporting that may be most responsible for the transmission of legal doctrine.
For example, all federal appellate opinions designated for publication are included in the Federal Reporters (rather than being separated out into regional publications), so a panel of judges from the First Circuit arguably has easy access to the legal rules established by the Fifth Circuit.
Additionally, the hierarchical arrangement of courts within the federal system works to structure the patterns of diffusion. Courts that are lower in the hierarchy (e.g., trial courts, intermediate appellate courts) are bound by precedents established by their courts of last resort, and on matters of federal law, state courts are bound by federal court pronouncements. In the federal judiciary, the intermediate appellate courts are organized into regionally based "circuits"; each circuit cultivates its own body of precedent and, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, can emulate or ignore other circuits' legal innovations as it sees fit. (Caldeira 1985) finds that courts are more likely to adopt a precedent from their peers when the two courts exist within the same regional communication channel (i.e., distance and legal reporting district). Consequently, it is likely that policy learning facilitates judicial diffusion, especially given the propensity of courts to cite the decisions of other courts and judges as a way to justify their own decisions (Solberg, Emrey et al. 2006, Shipan and Volden 2008) . (Klein 2002 ) discusses the importance of widespread circuit acceptance of a rule; he finds that increased circuit support for a given rule heightens the probability that subsequent judges will adopt. This finding is underscored by another conclusion: that judges are less likely to adopt the doctrine in question when a previous ruling includes a dissent (Klein 2002) . Taken together, the impact of widespread circuit acceptance and presence of a dissenting opinion indicate the judges want to be sure of the "success" (in this case, defined as legal viability or "settled" meaning) of a new rule (see also (Phillips and Grattet 2000) . Again, this mirrors the legislative diffusion process, as governments are more likely to adopt an innovation that has already proven to be successful at some level (Volden 2006) .
Similarly, (Solberg, Emrey et al. 2006) find that judges on the Courts of Appeals do seem to be influenced by the decisions and opinions of other circuits. However, this effect happens over time; early in the process of developing a new area of law, judges are more reliant on the characteristics of their own circuits. This finding provides support for the idea that judicial diffusion is a slow process that is driven by policy learning: judges wait to adopt an innovative rule or doctrine until they are assured of its success and support across other circuits (Phillips and Grattet 2000 , Klein 2002 , Volden 2006 . The authors also note that circuits are more likely to cite outside opinions when making decisions in cases involving particularly difficult issues (Solberg, Emrey et al. 2006 ).
The logic is simple: in such cases the circuit majority is seeking additional justification to enhance the legitimacy of its opinion.
Part II: Assessing the Impact of Politicization on the Diffusion of Court Rulings The Tightening of Scrutiny Concerning Application of Affirmative Action
In Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 570 U.S. ____ (2013) the majority opinion strengthens the level of strict scrutiny that must be applied in order for race-based admissions to meet a standard of constitutionality. There has been the legal contention and argument made that the fourteenth amendment proscribes the use of race as a factor in the admissions policy of a University. This was the main controversy in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, (1974) . DeFunis was a student that was denied admittance to the University of Washington's Law School and subsequently filed suit, arguing that minorities of equal or lesser qualifications were admitted on the basis of their minority status.
The case was eventually dismissed on procedural grounds as DeFunis was later accepted into the institution. By the time the Supreme Court was ready to hear the case, DeFunis was months away from graduating, and the suit was found to be moot. Despite the fact that the specific controversy was found to be moot in DeFunis v. Odegaard, Justices Douglas and Brennan wrote dissenting opinions arguing that the case should be adjudicated due to the social significance of the controversy, and because the lack of adjudication by the Court now would only lead to a duplication of the Court's effort because the issue was certainly going to be brought forth again. Justice Douglas, Justice Marshall, and Justice White joined Justice Brennan's dissent.
Four years later the Court heard the case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) . The University of California Medical School at Davis held sixteen spots out of one hundred spots for "qualified" minority students, which would amount to a strict quota system of affirmative action in accepting applicants to a University. Allan Bakke applied two times to the school and was denied admission both times, even though Bakke's qualifications were argued to have exceeded any and all of those of the minority students that were admitted. Being one of the most divided opinions ever offered in the history of the Supreme Court, and the first to fully consider affirmative action programs at universities, there were a total of six opinions authored. The judgment of the Court was delivered as a plurality, as none of the authored opinions gained a majority of Justices. Justice Powell's opinion became the opinion of the Court, and it struck down the special admissions policy of the University of California Medical School at Davis as it was a rigid quota system found to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bakke's admittance to the University was ordered. Justices Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined this portion of the opinion striking down of the quota program at the University. Justice Powell put forth that the University's program specifically was unnecessary to further the State interest in diversity, and was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause (438 U.S.
307).
Despite the admissions program being struck down, the invalidation was only specific to the University of California Medical School at Davis. The Court found that race could indeed be considered, even under strict scrutiny, because the desired objective of a diverse student body was and is a compelling state interest. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Powell in this portion of the opinion that found affirmative action constitutionally permissible under some circumstances (438 U.S. 311-312). To summarize the divided opinion of the Court: diversity of student body is a legitimate State interest that would allow for the consideration of race in admissions, however a strict quota system overly burdens individual liberties and is not narrowly tailored. Other means can be used, as noted by Justice Powell (438 U.S. 316). Of primary importance was the determination that the objective of achieving a diverse student body was indeed a compelling state interest. Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today" (539 U.S. 310). Justices Ginsberg, joined by Justice Breyer, authored a concurring opinion in which they did not agree that affirmative action measures would no longer be necessary in a quarter of a century.
The primary dissent, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia argued that the system used by the University of Michigan Law School was a thinly veiled quota system. Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that, in his opinion, the University of Michigan's admissions program is not narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional muster:
I do not believe that the Constitution gives the Law School such free rein in the use of race. The Law School has offered no explanation for its actual admissions practices and, unexplained, we are bound to conclude that the Law School has managed its admissions program, not to achieve a "critical mass," but to extend offers of admission to members of selected minority groups in proportion to their statistical representation in the applicant pool. But this is precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court itself calls "patently unconstitutional."
In Fisher v. University of Texas 570 U.S. __ (2013) , the focus case of this paper, the strict scrutiny standard is further elaborated upon in the majority decision. This interpretation of the strict scrutiny standard for affirmative action policies is a shift in the burden of proof to the universities to show that not only does the program further the objective of diversity, but it also must be the least restrictive means of doing so in that every other option that is to be considered "race-neutral" must be insufficient in furthering the interest.
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, argued to overturn the ruling in Grutter and argued that the use of race at all in admissions policies is "categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause." Justice Scalia, also in a concurring opinion, echoed his dissent in Grutter: "The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception." The concurrences, as well as the majority opinion in the case, show a clear shift towards a stringent application use of strict scrutiny,
Fisher makes an excellent test case to measure the influence of Court opinion. First, it is a politically salient case that garnered significant media attention. It was considered one of the 'blockbuster' cases before the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2012-13 Term receiving above-the-fold, front page coverage the day of oral argument before the Supreme Court from most major newspapers (Liptak 2012) . In addition, the release of the final decision remanding the case back to the fifth circuit was carried live on most major cable news providers and covered extensively in the nation's top newspapers (Liptak 2013) . This ruling also contained a significant ideological component with its subject concerning affirmative action. This was not a case concerning the details of tax legislation or the application of the APA. It concerned a hotly debated topic. Also to our benefit, the ruling from the Court was clear. The directive to the lower courts and to the affected parties was evident in the opinion and little room was left for interpretation. Finally, the universe of affected parties was relatively small. Plus this universe of public institutions of higher education were primarily sophisticated parties that maintained their own legal staff to provide accurate transmission of this precedent. In short, Fisher is the ideal precedent to test the impact of the politicization of the Court on its ability to persuade others to follow its ruling.
Part III: Testing the Theory The Diffusion of Court Precedent to the Lower Courts
To test the impact of the Supreme Court's influence on lower court opinion, we conducted a search of all lower federal court opinions that cited Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 570 U.S. ____, (2013) on March 1, 2015 or twenty months beyond the decision date. This search produced a list of thirty cases decided throughout the federal court system in this time period (see Appendix I). This paucity of cases allowed us to investigate each to determine why Fisher was being cited. In the large majority of these cases, the use of our precedent was to ground the understanding of strict scrutiny in boilerplate language. These cases did not concern higher education or the application of affirmative action. Four lower court cases did pertain to affirmative action in an education setting. These cases are addressed in turn. Education, et. al. v. Maryland Higher Education Commission (Civil No. CCB-06-2773) . The plaintiffs in the case argue that the defendants have not satisfied their affirmative duty to remove any and all vestiges of de jure segregation in higher education institutions.
In October of 2013 the District Court of Maryland heard the case of The Coalition for Equity and Excellence in Maryland Higher
There has been historically a wide disparity (admitted by the defendants in the case) in funding to as well as opportunities born from traditionally white institutions as opposed to historically black institutions in the state. The plaintiffs in the case argue that these disparities trace historically back to the era of de jure segregation, which would indicate that the defendants indeed did not discharge their duty properly in affirmatively dismantling the discriminatory practices.
District Judge Catherine C. Blake concluded with a suggestion that the parties enter the This cases concerns the allocation of seats within the district's English Language Learners (ELL)
program and the district's gifted program. Plaintiff's argued that seats were being denied to worthy applicants in both programs due to the race or ethnicity of the applicant. The ruled that while the distribution of seats for the ELL program did not violate the equal protection clause, the district's method for determining who gains entrance into its grifted program did. In discussing the districts gifted program, the opinion notes, "Segregating public school children on the basis of race or ethnicity is inherently suspect. Programs that segregate public school children by ethnicity are subject to strict scrutiny, and the school district bears the burden to show that its actions are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest to have such a program. Parents (1989) ). This is the only reference to Fisher in the opinion. It is evidently used as a vehicle to repeat the admonition of Croson of the application of strict scrutiny.
None of the four cases just outlined or any of the remaining twenty-six cases that cite Fisher specifically mentions the increased scrutiny demanded by the majority. It is as if the opinion has been left unstated.
The Diffusion of Court Precedent on Affected Parties
Courts, of course, are not the only institutions impacted by the rulings of the U.S Supreme
Court. While we tend to focus on the impact of the Court's rulings as translated through subsequent court decisions, it is the affected parties that are most impacted by the Court's opinions. As such, it can be expected that these parties are most likely to alter their behavior in response to a Court ruling that does not correspond to their current manner of conducting business. This is exactly the case with Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 570 U.S. ____ (2013) . As noted above, Fisher sends a clear dictate to a limited universe of impacted parties on how to alter their admissions process. Specifically, the majority opinion places the burden on university officials and admission officers to use the 'least restrictive means' to obtain a diverse student body. As Justice Kennedy remarked for the majority,
Once the University has established that its goal of diversity is consistent with strict scrutiny, however, there must still be a further judicial determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation. The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal. On this point, the University receives no deference. Grutter made clear that it is for the courts, not for university administrators, to ensure that
he means chosen to accomplish the [government's] asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose." 539 U. S., at 333
(internal quotation marks omitted), . . . Narrow tailoring also requires that the reviewing court verify that it is "necessary" for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity. Bakke, supra, at 305. This involves a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications. Although "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative," strict scrutiny does require a court to examine with care, and not defer to, a university's "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives." See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 339-340 (emphasis added body. Other plans are available as well. For instance, the same principle could be followed if universities accounted for the postal zip code of the primary residence of their applicants in the admissions process. As neighborhoods across Texas have become more racially and ethnically segregated, this would also be a means of obtaining a diverse student body without directly taking race or ethnicity into account.
We administered a short survey to the admission officials at a randomly selected two hundred and two public universities (Appendix II). These universities were randomly sampled from a list of all public universities in the United States (Appendix III). The survey was administered via an email link created utilizing Qualtrics over a four week period (March 1, 2015 -March 29, 2015 with two follow-up email requests for participation sent approximately one week and two weeks after the initial request. Our response rate was low at slightly less than five percent as officials from only ten institutions completed the survey. What is most remarkable is than of the small number of completed surveys, none of those surveyed reported they took the race or ethnicity into consideration in any way during the admissions process. In addition, when asked specifically if they had altered their admission process in any way in response to the dictates of Fisher, none of the respondents reported they did so. When specifically asked if they had considered race-neutral alternatives as a means to select a diverse student body, again none of the respondents reported that they did.
Part IV: Is Anyone Listening?
This research paper reports the initial efforts to assess whether or not the politicization of the U.S. Supreme Court and the judiciary has lessened the authority of the Court on both lower levels of the judiciary and impacted parties. While the evidence we provide suggests this is indeed the case in both circumstances, we are disappointed with our results. First, we trace the impact of a single case, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 570 U.S. ____ (2013) to assess our assertions. This is fraught with all the difficulties of any case study. It is logically impossible to determine generalizability. In addition, there may not have been enough time for the dictates suggested in the majority opinion of Fisher to witness its full impact on the rulings of lower courts of alter the behavior of impacted parties. This is suggested both by the lack of cases found in the federal courts specifically applying
Fisher's suggested strong scrutiny and by the failure of impacted parties to report an alteration of their processes in the admissions process. This suggests further study is warranted. We plan to follow up this study with one that samples cases from across the legal spectrum that have been decided recently but not quite so recently.
Still even with acknowledging these limitations in the design and implementation of our study, it does suggest that the politicization of the courts is have a deleterious impact on its ability to have its rulings followed. We may be at the beginning of a new era in American governance in which the courts are no longer considered a 'non-political' part of our system. Instead they will be viewed as simply another part of our political system with all the foibles and weaknesses we traditionally associate with the more traditional branches of government. The implications of such a transformation are profound and likely to be unwelcome. Introduction
This study attempts to collect information about the response of academic institutions to the changing dictates of the U.S. Supreme Court in reference to the use of race and ethnicity in admissions selection process of your students. S. 265 (1978) was that race may be considered in the admission process but it must not be the sole or primary consideration. This forbids the strict use of racial quotas in the admissions process. Following this precedent in 2003, the Court determined that the establishment of a diverse student body is a compelling interest that allows for a limited consideration of race in the admission process (Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306), however, the consideration of an applicant's race must be conducted in a 'holistic' manner such that the use of a 'points' system of admission that awards points based on ethnicity is unconstitutional (Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244). Finally, Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. ___ (2013) , reaffirmed the holdings of Bakke and Grutter in allowing race to be considered in the admissions process but stated that the university must "prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity." Our research is primarily focused on this additional requirement.
Procedures
You will be asked a series of questions concerning your academic institution and its admission process. The questionnaire consists of twenty questions and will take approximately ten minutes or less to complete. Questions are designed to determine how your institution considers race/ethnicity in its admissions process and whether adjustments have been made in reaction to the differing interpretations of the U.S. Constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court. This questionnaire is conducted with an online Qualtrics-created survey.
Risks/Discomforts
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. All information provided will remain confidential and will not be shared. Data obtained from this survey will not identify the institution from which it was obtained. We are solely interested with the aggregate pattern revealed by this data not each individual respondent.
Benefits
There are no direct benefits for participants. However, it is hoped that through your participation, researchers will learn more about how institutions react to decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court.
Confidentiality
All data obtained from participants will be kept confidential and will only be reported in an aggregate format (by reporting only combined results and never reporting individual ones). All questionnaires will be concealed, and no one other than then primary investigators listed below will have access to them. The data collected will be stored in the HIPPA-compliant, Qualtrics-secure database until it has been deleted by the primary investigators.
Compensation
There is no direct compensation for any respondents.
Participation
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at anytime or refuse to participate entirely without jeopardy. If you desire to withdraw, please close your Internet browser and notify the principal investigator at this email: yacobupr@buffalostate.edu
Questions about the Research
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Dr. Peter R. Yacobucci, Associate Professor of Political Science, SUNY Buffalo State, at 716-878-6116.
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants
If you have questions you do not feel comfortable asking the researcher, you may contact the director of SUNY Buffalo State's Institutional Review Board, Dr. Jill Novilitis, 716-878-3145, norviljm@buffalostate.edu. I have read, understood, and, if desired, printed a copy of the above consent form. I desire of my own free will to participate in this study.
• Yes
•
No
Survey Questions: How is Race Considered?
1. Does your institution consider the race or the ethnicity of its applicants in any way in the admissions process? • Applicants are divided into separate admission 'pools' based on the expressed ethnicity/race. Admission decisions are then made independently in each pool.
• Applicants are awarded additional admission points based on their particular ethnicity/race
• An applicant's race/ethnicity is taken into consideration during the admissions process as a primary factor in determining whether to grant admission
• An applicant's race/ethnicity is taken into consideration during the admissions process as a secondary or tertiary factor in determining whether to grant admission
• An applicant's race/ethnicity is taken into consideration during the admissions process only as a minor factor in
• Yield likelihood • Development potential 9. At your institution, is the financial status or the applicant or the applicant's family taken into consideration during the admission decision process?
• Frequently
